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Liability for Graiuitous Services and
Negligent Statements in Montana
The recent Montana Supreme Court decision of Suit v. Scandreta1
presents an interesting study in the care required when rendering gratuitous
services and liability for making negligent statements to others who can
be foreseen as acting on them in a business way.
In this case, the Milwaukee Railroad maintained scales at Melstone,
Montana, for the use of livestock shippers. The plaintiff, a prospective
shipper over the railroad, informed the defendant's agent by letter that
cattle would be weighed on the scales preparatory to being shipped and
requested that the scales be placed in a good staie of repair.
The railroad agent informed the plaintiff's agent that the scales
were in good condition, so the plaintiff drove his cattle into Melstone.
After commencing weighing, it was discovered that the scales were in a
poor state of repair and did not weigh correctly because of which the
purchaser declined to accept the cattle. Later, after driving the cattle
back to the ranch, the plaintiff decided to ship the cattle over the same
railroad to Sioux City and there received a lower price for the cattle than
he would have received under the original contract.
Plaintiff based his complaint upon two main theories, the first being
the general rule adopted in Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co. 2 which had
been quoted from CORPUS JURIS.3 The rule states that
".. . where a person undertakes to do an act or discharge a duty
by which the conduct of another may be properly regulated and
governed, he is bound to perform it, in such a manner that those
who are rightfully led to a course of conduct or action on the faith
that the act or duty will be duly and properly performed shall not
suffer loss or injury by reason of the negligent failure so to per-
form it."
The rule, although commonly enough applied today to a variety of
cases, hasn't always been so accepted. Courts in early common law were
too much concerned with the "ancient patchwork built upon the doctrines
i(1947) ........ Mont ......... 178 P. (2d) 405.
2(1936) 102 Mont. 43, 55 P. (2d) 694.
345 C. J. Negligence, p. 650.
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of trespass" 4 to be concerned with the failure of conferring a benefit upon
another. The distinction between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance" accen-
tuated this difficulty, because the older cases held that when the wrong
consisted in the failure to act, there was mere "nonfeasance" and no
direct duty. 5
The first imposition of liability appeared in those cases dealing with
"public callings," when by holding themselves out to the public the de.
fendants were regarded as having undertaken a duty. Then with the
development of assumpsit it was extended to the relationship we now
call a contract. 6
Liability has been extended during reecnt years to those situations
where public and social policy has found a relationship of potential eco-
nomic advantage between the parties which demands that one party be
protected in this relationship or to situations where there is a promise
of gratuitous service involving reliance and resulting in the misleading
of the promisee so that he fails to do what otherwise he would do to pro-
tect himself. The present tendency is also to abandon the superficial
distinction between "nonfeasance" and "misfeasance" but we find ghosts
of the old ideas still cropping up at times. 7
It is with this problem of how far to extend liability and to what
relationships that the courts are currently struggling. The doctrine can
be an unlimited one, and some means must be sought to restrict liability
within reasonable bounds. 8 For example, it is still held by a majority that
a water company which contracts with a city to supply water for fire fight-
ing is not liable to a citizen for its failure to do so. Perhaps the most
famous of these cases is Much Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.9 Cardozo,
in writing the opinion, attempted to make a distinction' on the ground
that one is not under a duty to affirmatively confer a benefit upon another.
The case has been criticized, not so much as to the decision because
the burden on the water companies by allowing recovery would be great,
but because the reasoning used was not the best when it could have been
based on the grounds of public policy. 10  However, in view of the fact
4 Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV.
372 (1939).
5 Note 4, supra.6PROSSER ON TORTS, p. 191.
7HARPER ON TORTS, 81.
8Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1225 (1937).
9(1928) N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199.
1ONote 4, supra.
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that the city failed to make other provision for the protection of its
citizens, and lulled them into a false feeling of security so that they failed
individually to take precautionary measures, it is difficult to see why the
contractor should not be held liable. Three cases have so held11 and
another allowed damages for the negligent breaking of a water main
leading to a home with the result that the owner was thus deprived of
the assistance of the fire department. 12
Another difficulty experienced by early courts was centered about
the word "privity." Concerned with extending contract duties to a third
person, many of them followed the idea that privity of contract was neces-
sary before a duty of care was due. 13 Although Cardozo exposed this
error in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,14 privity has remained to vex
some courts.
The modern approach is tipyfied in the case of Woodbury v. Tampa
Water Works Co.15 in which the court said,
"No privity of contract is necessary to support an action in tort for
a direct invasion of a legal right or for the infraction of a duty
implied by law. . . . Where there is a duty and negligence in per-
forming the duty with resulting injury, there is liability."
The rule expressed in the Standard Publishing- Co. case 16 dearly
indicates that as a condition to liability there must be a reliance upon the
defendant's gratuitous act and this appears to be the better rule. The
reliance may result in an affirmative act as in the Suit case or in merely
neglecting to do something essential which could have prevented the in-
jury.17
A case which clearly expresses the betterrule is that of Erie R. Co. v.
Stewart.18 In this case, the defendant railroad, with no statute requiring
it, voluntarily maintained a watchman at a particularly dangerous cross-
ing. The watchman failed to give warning to an approaching automobile
and as a result an accident ensued. The driver of the automobile had
knowledge that the watchman was maintained, and relied upon his absence
11Fisher v. Greensboro Water Supply Co. (1901) 128 N. C. 375, 38 S.E.
912; Mugge v. Tampa Water Works Co. (1906) 52 Fla. 371, 42 So.
81 Harlan Water Co. v. Carter (1927) 220 Ky. 493, 295 S.W. 426.
12 Gilbert v. New Mexico Const. Co. (1935) 39 N. M. 216, 44 P. (2d) 489.
13 Note 4, supra.
14(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050, LR.A. 1916F 696.
15(1909) 57 Fla. 234, 49 So. 556, L.R.A. (N.S.) 1034.
16 Note 2, supra.
17Note 11, supra.
18(1930) 40 F. (2d) 855.
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as an assurance of safety and implied invitation to cross. The court said,
"But when the practice is known to the traveler upon the highway,
and such traveler has been educated into reliance upon it, some
positive duty must rest upon the railway with reference thereto ...
having led the traveler into reliance . . ., it should not be permitted
theerafter to say that no duty arose. . . Where the voluntary
employment of a watchman was unknown to the traveler upon the
highway, the mere absence of such watchman could probably not
be considered as negligence toward him . . ., for in such case there
is neither an established duty positively owing to such traveler
nor had he been led into reliance upon the custom."
The Montana Supreme Court in the Standard Publishing Co. case
took a very liberal view in regard to the furnishing of gratuitous services,
because it apparently did not consider the matter of reliance. In that case,
the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries received in a fall on
an icy sidewalk adjacent to the defendant's place of business as a result
of an accumulation of ice and snow thereon. The defendant had con-
structed and maintained the walk and had customarily cleared the walk
of snow and ice early in the morning. On the morning of the accident
the walk was not cleared until 10 o'clock, more than an hour after the
accident occurred. The court held that the plaintiff should recover because
the defendant had constructed the walk, assumed the duty of maintenance
and had undertaken the duty of removing the accumulation of ice and
snow.
In the Montana case of Childers v. Deschamps,1 9 the court affirmed
the common law view that the occupant of property owes no duty to
pedestrians to keep adjacent sidewalks free from snow and ice coming
thereon from natural causes and an ordinance requiring lot owners to keep
the sidewalks free doesn't impose civil liability.
In the Standard Publishing Co. case the court based its decision
upon the prior voluntary cleaning of the walk, but it fails to point out
in what manner the plaintiff relied upon the gratuitous service. It must
have been apparent to the plaintiff that the walk had not been cleared
because the accident occurred during the day, and even if the plaintiff
knew of the defendant's practice of clearing the walks-and there is no
showing of this-it is hard to see on what basis she walked there in re-
liance on the practice.20 A blind man, who would probably choose his
sidewalks carefully in the winter time, might be justified in claiming re-
19(1930) 87 Mont. 505, 290 P. 261.
2OGilbert, Voluntary Assumption of Duty, 6 MONT. L. REV. 51 (1945).
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liance, but the average person would not appear to have any justification
for so claiming.
The court could have placed more emphasis on the fact that the
sidewalk apparently was defective in that stones had become uneven so
that water could collect and freeze, thus putting the case on the basis of
Childers v. Deschamps,2 1 but there is no showing that such a theory was
presented. In the Childers case a defective pipe used to convey water
from the roof of a building to the ground permitted water to fall on the
sidewalk and form an icy condition there. The court allowed recovery
because it was the owner's negligence which allowed the pipe to become
defective and the owner knew or should have known of the dangerous
condition.
It would indeed come as a surprise to the average citizen to find
himself subject to liability because he failed to clear his sidewalk of snow
one morning after having done so for several months prior thereto while
if he had never cleared it he would have escaped liability. Such distinction
between the usually meritorious and the one lacking in merit can hardly
be justified.
The court in the principal case relies heavily upon an Arizona case22
in which the defendant was charged with liability for failure to maintain
a sidewalk. The court said that the abutting owner by voluntarily con-
structing and having under his control a sidewalk adjoining his premises
and by maintaining it for a number of years was charged with the duty
of exercising care to prevent the sidewalk from becoming a source of
danger. It had apparently with the defendant's knowledge become dan-
gerous.
However, the accident in the Arizona case was caused by a de-
fective sidewalk and not by failure to clear it of ice and snow. The law
is well settled in this state by a long line of decisions that an abutting
property owner isn't liable for failure to keep the sidewalks in front of
his premises in repair.2 3 The Arizona court recognized the same rule,
but pointed out that the decision was applicable to the particular facts
of the case and should not be regarded as controlling when the facts are
different. The difference between the Arizona case and the Standard
21Note 19, supra.
2 2Cummings v. Henninger (1925) 28 Ariz. 207, 236 P. 701, 41 A.L.R.
207.
2 3 Heodley v. Hammond Building, Inc. (1934) 97 Mont. 243, 33 P. (2d)
574; Nord v. Butte Water Co. (1934) 96 Mont. 311, 30 P. (2d) 809;
Mitchell v. Thomas (1932) 91 Mont. 370, 8 P. (2d) 639.
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Publishing Co. case appears to center around the word "reliance" for in
the former the plaintiff relied upon the owner's assumption of duty and
in the latter it is difficult to see how this was present.
There are numerous other cases applying the rule adopted by the
Supreme Court in the Suit case such as landlords being held liable for
gratuitously making repairs which injured the tenant,24 where one gratu-
itously undertakes to render assistance to another who is hurt,25 and when
one picks up a hitch-hiker on the highway. 2 6
The RESTATEMENTS ON TORTS27 has adopted the principle
as has the RESTATEMENTS ON AGENCY 2 8 and both sections make
the plaintiff's reliance upon the gratuitous conduct a necessary ingredient
for liability. The former limits the liability to bodily harm while the
latter does not. No good reason for such a limitation is apparent.
There can be no argument that in the Suit case the service was
other than gratuitous, for the existence of any duty on the part of a
carrier to install scales is expressly negatived in several cases. 29 There
is no doubt that the defendant could have discontinued the service any
time before the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the undertaking, because
in such a situation the plaintiff could not have been hurt. This idea of
withdrawal has been expressed by statute.30 However, in the principal
case the railroad agent never informed the plaintiff before the cattle were
drivn to Melstone that the service was withdrawn. This principle was
enunciated in Erie R. Co. v. Stewart31 where the court said,
"This duty has been recognized as not only actual and positive, but
as absolute, in the sense that the practice may not be discontinued
without exercising reasonable care to give warning of such dis-
continuance."
It thus appears that the defendant in the Suit case was rendering
a gratuitous service upon which the plaintiff's conduct was regulated and
24 Gill v. Middleton (1870) 105 Mass. 477, 7 Am. Rep. 548; Finer v.
Nichols (1913) 175 Mo. App. 525, 157 S.W. 1023.
2 5 SIater v. III. Cent. R. Co. (1911) 209 F. 480; Gates v. Chesapeake &
0. R. Co. (1919) 185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564.
2 6Avery v. Thompson (1918) 117 Me. 120, A. 4, L.R.A. 1918D 205;
Munson v. Rupker (1925) 148 N.E. 169.
27RESTATEMENT, TORTS, 325 .
28RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, .378.
29Gt. Northern R. Co. v. Cohill (1920) 253 U. S. 71, 64 L.Ed. 787, 40
S. Ct. 457, 10 A.L.R. 1335; Gt. Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota (1915)
238 U. S. 340, 59 L.Ed. 1337, 35 S. Ct. 753.
30R.C.M. 1935, 7769.
3 1 Note 18, supra.
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upon which the plaintiff relied in the belief that the service would be
properly performed. However, the service was not so properly performed
and the plaintiff suffered a detriment. All of the essentials for liability
were thus present and the Supreme Court recognized that fact.
The plaintiff based his second cause of action in the Suit case on
the fact that he relied upon a false statement negligently made by the
defendant while owing a duty to speak truthfully. This arose from the
notification by the railroad's freight agent that the scales were in good
condition upon which the plaintiff relied in driving his cattle into Mel-
stone. But when the weighing began it was found that the scales did not
weigh correctly because the pit was filled with mud and water.
The theory upon which the plaintiff relies is one of negligent mis-
representation which is as yet so intermingled with other actions as to
cause considerable difficulty. Much of this confusion has arisen from
failure to distinguish three different sets of legal principles which have
often been lumped together under one classification of deceit or fraud.
In reality, it can be broken down into intended wrongs, strict responsi-
bility and negligent wrongs.3 2
The English case, Derry v. Peek,33 first separated the deceit action
from the other two by classifying it as an intended wrong or what is equal
to a conscious misrepresentation, and that deceit will not lie for negligent
misrepresentations. The lines of demarcation still are not sharply divided
and a minority of the American cases have extended the action of deceit
into that of negligent misrepresentations by supplying scienter by means
of such fictions as conclusive presumptions or imputations of negligence.3
As a result of this divergence in courts, writers are not at all in
accord as to which is the better view although to differentiate negligent
misrepresentation from deceit appears to be the favored view. However,
courts have been wary of extending liability caused from negligent mis-
representations to the extent they do in the cases of deceit, probably
because of the danger of imposing liability for damage done to remote
plaintiffs which could be far out of proportion to- the sometimes slight
inadvertent negligence involved. This general trend to limit the scope
greatly has in some cases even been extended so far as to make it de-
32 Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 733 (1927); PROSSER ON TORTS, p. 726.
33(1888) 14 A.C. 337, 58 L.J.Ch. 864.
34Tort Liability for Negligent Language, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 216 (1928);
HARPER ON TORTS, 76.
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pendent upon the existence of a contract which directly involves the giving
of information.3 6
Where the negligent misrepresentations were made directly to the
plaintiff, as in the Suit case, courts have little difficulty, which is also
true when made to the third person with knowledge that he intends to
communicate it to the specific individual for the purpose of inducing
him to act. However, courts are reluctant to extend liability further and
"... anticipation that the statement will be communicated to others, or
even knowledge that the recipient intends to make a commercial use of
it in dealing with unspecified strangers, is not sufficient to create a duty
of care towards them."3 6
The case of Ultramares Corporation v. Touche37 has been a leading
one in showing how courts courts differentiate in their imposing of liability
in the case of negligence and of deceit. In this case, an accounting firm
negligently certified a balance sheet without knowledge that the plaintiff
would rely upon it, but with the knowledge that it would be used in general
financial dealings. Liability in negligence was rejected because there was
no contemplation of the plaintiff's reliance, but judgment was held for
the plaintiff on the grounds of deceit because of neglect so great as to
amount to scienter.
However, the trend in present cases is to extend liability beyond
the present rule that defendant must have the particular plaintiff in mind
as the end and aim of the transaction who might rely on the service. The
trend appears to be to carry the negligent misrepresentation to any mem-
ber of a class of persons to whom the defendant has authorized the re-
cipient to transmit the information. This is the view adopted by the RE-
STATEMENT ON TORTS.3 8
At the turn of the past century the rule expressed in the New York
case of Thorne v. Deas39 was still prevalent. In that case, the defendant
a joint owner of a vessel, voluntarily promised to take out insurance on
the ship. He failed to do so, the ship was lost at sea, and the plaintiff
attempted to hold him on the promise. The court held for the defendant
35 Scholes v. Brookes (1891) 63 L.T.R. 837; LeLievre v. Gould (1893)
1 Q.B. 491. For a spirited exchange of views see Green, Deceit, 16 VA.
L. REV. 749 (1930); Bohlen, Should Negligent Misrepresentations Be
Treated as Negligence or Fraud?, 18 VA. L. REV. 703 (1932); Green,
Innocent Misrepresentations, 19 VA. L. REV. 242 (1933).
36 PROSSER ON TORTS, p. 737.
37(1931) 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 74 A.L.R. 1139.
38 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, .552.
39(1809) 4 Johns N. Y. 84.
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 9 [1948], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/13
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
in saying, ". . . one who undertakes to do an act for another, without
reward, is not answerable for omitting to do the act, and is only respon-
sible when he attempts to do it, and does it amiss."
Since that time courts have extended the scope of liability and today
even though the speaker has an honest belief in the truth of his state-
ment he may be held because of "lack of reasonable care in ascertaining
the facts, or in the manner of expression, or absence of the skill . -.. re-
quired by a particular business or profession." 40
The court in the Suit case has relied heavily on International Products
Co. v. Erie Railroad Co.4 1 There the defendant, about to become a bailee
of the plaintiff's goods, in reply to the latter's inquiry known to the de-
fendant to have been made for the purpose of insuring the goods, negli-
gently misrepresented the location of the goods. Due to this misdescrip.
tion, the plaintiff was unable to collect on the insurance policy when the
goods were accidentally destroyed by fire. The defendant was held for
liable for the losses, the court stating,
"Liability in such cases arises only where there is a duty, if one
speaks at all, to give the correct information. And that involves
many considerations. There must be knowledge, or its equivalent,
that the information is desired for a serious purpose; that he to
whom it is given intends to rely and act upon it; that, if false or
erroneous, he will because of it be injured in person or property.
Finally, the relationship of the parties, arising out of contract or
otherwise, must be such that in morals and good conscience the one
has the right to rely upon the other for information and the other
giving the information owes a duty to give it with care."
One recent case 42 restricts the liability by requiring the representa-
tion to be made directly to the plaintiff, a requirement inferred by the
language in the International Products case. One writer in commenting
on the case argues that liability ought to be imposed for proximate dam-
ages determined by the established rules of the law of negligence, and
that competing interests of freedom of utterance and protection against
negligent misrepresentations could be balanced by determining whether
in the particular circumstances the man of ordinary intelligence and pru-
dence would have felt himself constrained not to speak unless he had
first investigated the facts. 43
4 OPROSSER ON TORTS, p. 733.
41 (1927) 244 N. Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662, 56 A.L.R. 1377.
42Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shonghai Banking Corp. (1927) 245
N. Y. 377,'157 N.E. 272, 56 A.L.R. 1186.
43Tort Liability for Negligent Language, note 34, supra.
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Earlier cases which held the defendant liable are Cart v. Maine
Central R.4 4 and Siegal v. Spear.45  In the former the court imposed
liability because the defendant had promised to procure the consent of
the ICC for allowance of the plaintiff's claim for a rebate. The defendant,
in failing to forward the necessary papers in time, was liable for the rebate.
In the latter case, a furniture company agreed to store furniture free which
the plaintiff had bought from it and also agreed to obtain insurance upon
it. The insurance wasn't obtained and a subsequent fire destroyed the
furniture. The court held that the plaintiff could recover because he had
given up his property to the defendant who had entered on the execution
of the trust.
In Glanzer v. Shepard46 a bean merchant requested the defendants,
public weighers, to weigh beans which he had sold, make a return of the
weight and furnish the buyer with a copy. The defendants carelessly
certified the weight to be greater than that which in fact it was. On dis-
covering the discrepancy the buyer, who had already paid on the basis
of the false weight, brought suit against the defendants to recover the
amount of the overpayment. The court allowed the recovery in saying
that the defendant acted for the purpose of inducing action and that the
liability was based not merely on careless words but on the careless per-
formance of a service, the act of weighing.
Courts have little trouble imposing liability in the cases of gratui-
tous promises if they can find a bailment peg to hang it on, but it is clear
that this is not a necessity today. Other cases imposing liability are fairly
numerous.
As is the case in gratuitous undertakings, the promisee is not en-
titled to claim the benefit of the promise merely because it is made and
a subsequent withdrawal made before injury-and in time to enable the
promisee to protect himself will result in no liability.
In the principal case we have a relationship which by the better
view should be such that in morals and good conscience, the defendant
had a right to rely upon the other for information-that of a prospective
shipper with a railroad. In applying the rules laid down by the International
Products case,4 7 there can be little doubt but that the information con-
cerning the scales was desired for a serious purpose, because the shipping
44(1917) 78 N. H. 502, 102 Atl. 532, L.R.A. 1918E 389.
46(1923) 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N.E. 414, 26 A.L.R.1208.
46(1922) 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425.
47 Note 41, supra.
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of cattle can scarcely be considered anything else. Also, the defendant
knew the plaintiff was intending to ship his cattle over the railroad and
that a contract would ensue; thus, it must have been apparent that the
plaintiff was going to use the scales as he indicated he was and that he
had relied upon the statement that the scales were in good condition by
driving his cattle into Melstone.
But having established a duty and negligence, that alone is not
enough to make out a case for the plaintiff. Also present must be an
injury proximately caused by the negligence.4 8 Exemplary damages in
the principal case may be ruled out because of a Montana statute49 which
allows such damages only in the case of oppression, fraud, or malice,
actual or presumed, in actions other than contract. One Montana case 6°
has stated that something more than gross negligence must be shown in
order to justify exemplary damages, and because none of the essentials
are present in the Suit case, compensatory damages are the only ones
involved.
Rigney v. Swingley51 in speaking of the code section dealing with
compensatory damages stated that the injured party may recover those
damages which directly flow from the act of the person causing them.
However, how is the measure of damage to be determined? Should
the general contract law of "contemplation of the parties" or the usual
compensatory principle of negligence law be applied? The courts have
concerned themselves little with the problem and have applied the com-
pensatory principle for the most part although a small minority apply the
contract law test to negligence actions.6 2
The Montana Supreme Court in defining provimate cause has stated
it is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
new, independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred.63 The court has apparently adopted a
combination of the "foreseeability" rule and of the "natural and probable
consequences" rule in its test for proximate cause because in Reino Y. Mont.
M.L.D. Co.54 it stated,
48 Therrioult v. England (1911) 43 Mont. 376, 116 P. 581.
49R.C.M. 1935,, 8666.
60Cashin v. Northern Pac. R. Co. (1934) 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d) 862.
61(1941) 112 Mont. 104, 113 P. (2d) 344.
52155 A.L.R. 157.
63Mize v. Rocky Mt. Bell Tel. Co. (1909) 38 Mont. 521, 100 P. 971, 129
Am. St. Rep. 659.
64(1909) 38 Mont. 291, 99 P. 853.
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"It is not required that the 'specific' injury or 'such' an injury as
is complained of was or ought to have been specifically anticipated
as the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act. It
is sufficient if the facts and circumstances are such that the con-
sequences attributable to the wrongful conduct charged are within
the field of reasonable anticipation; that such consequences might
be the natural and probable results thereof, though they may not
have been specifically contemplated or anticipated by the person
so causing them."
In later cases55 the Supreme Court has said that one damaged
is not required to show that the defendant who was negligent should have
foreseen the particular damage suffered, but only that a reasonably pru-
dent person should have foreseen that damage was likely to ilow as a
natural consequence of his negligent act.
What then, is the injury upon which damage can be predicated in
the Suit case? The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to answer that
question, because the issue involved was whether the complaint was subject
to a general demurrer. The court held that because the plaintiff was
entitled to some relief the complaint was proof against a general de-
murrer, but as to what particulr relief should be given, the court did
not state.
It might be argued that no damages were suffered unless the pur-
chaser of the cattle was justified in refusing to buy them as a result of
the faulty scales. If he wasn't so justified it might be urged that the
plaintiff's relief should be directed against the purchaser for breaking the
contract rather than against the railroad.
However, the contract between the plaintiff and the purchaser was
for the sale of the cattle to be delivered at Melstone and there to be
weighed on the defendant's scales, the purchase price to be paid and the
cattle to be shipped to various destinations. It would thus appear that
a material condition of the contract involved the weighing of the cattle,
so that the purchasers were undoubtedly justified in refusing to buy the
cattle when they discovered the scales to be faulty.
It must have been apparent to the defendant that some damage
was likely to flow as a natural consequence of the negligent act, thus
making some damage foreseeable and putting the situation squarely within
the rule announced before in Reino v. Mont. M.L.D. Co. 5 6 Cattle aren't
55 Heckomon v. N. P. R. Co. (1933) 93 Mont. 363, 20 P. (2d) 1933; note
53, supra.
56 Note 54, supra.
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sold as a general rule on the basis of a certain amount per head but upon
the basis of weight. This fact must have been known to the defendant's
agents as was also the fact that the plaintiff was going to rely on the
scales to ascertain the weight of his cattle prior to shipment. In view
of these circumstances, there can be but little doubt that the defendant
should have known that some damage would ensue if the scales weren't
in good condition.
The plaintiff alleged that as a result of the negligence he was forced
to ship the cattle over the defendant's railroad to Sioux City and there
sell them at a much lower price than the original contract called for. He
asked $6,000 for the loss of the contract and although the decision doesn't
so state, it is reasonable to assume that amount represented the difference
between the two contracts.
As previously stated, courts have been reulctant to extend the scope
of damages in cases involving gratuitous services and negligent misrepre-
sentations fearing that the defendant will be liable far out of proportion
to the negligence involved. Thus the RESTATEMENT ON TORTS
5 7
illustrates the example of a doctor who promises to come immediately
to the aid of an injured person but fails to do so for some time, the
result of which is that the injury is aggravated because of the lack of
immediate attention. Even if it were understood that the services were
to be rendered gratuitously, the doctor is liable for the increased illness
because he has induced the injured man from procuring other help. But
on the other hand, if the doctor were the only one who could reach the
injured man's bedside before the time at which he actually did arrive, the
doctor would not be liable because there was no alternative protection
which the injured man could have procured as in the first example.
It is difficult to §see in the Sult case how the negligence was the
natural and probable cause of the difference in contract prices or that the
damages asked for had a casual difference in contract prices or that the
damages asked for had a casual connection with the negligence. In Lemos v.
Madden58 the Wyoming Supreme Court in speaking of probable con-
sequences stated,
"The question is not whether it was a possible consequence, but
whether it was probable, that is, likely to occur, according to the
usual experience of mankind .. .a wrongdoer is not responsible
for a consequence which is merely possible, according to occasional
57 Note 27, supra.
58(1921) 28 Wyo. 1, 200 P. 791; 45 C.J. Negligence, p. 913.
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experience, but only for a consequence which is probable, according
to the ordinary and usual experience."
The contract price difference appears to be in the "possible" class
rather than in the "probable" class. Furthermore, the shipment to Sioux
City was one made of the plaintiff's own volition, the defendant having
nothing to do with the making of that contract. The making of the
second contract appears to be an intervening and independent decision
too remote to enter into the damage caused by the faulty scales.
The real damages occasioned by the negligence are those which
took effect immediately-the shrinkage of the cattle in driving them into
Melstone and back to their range and the expense incurred in so doing.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has apparently extended the ia-
bility involved in rendering gratuitous services and for making negligent
statements to a reasonable and desirable point needed in the modem com-
plex society where dependence upon others is the rule rather than the
exception in business activity. It is hoped that by this case the court has
withdrawn from the too liberal rule applied in the Standard Publishing Co.
case and has put liability on the firm basis of reliance.
Bill Belingham.
Liability of the Manufacturer to the
Ultimate Consumer Under Modern
Merchandising Practices
A question that has perplexed the courts a great deal since the
turn of the century is that of the liability of either the manufacturer or
packer to the ultimate consumer for injuries sustained as a result of a
defect in the article he has sold. Since both the orthodox tort and war-
ranty remedies have proved inadequate to cope with this question there
is a great need, by judicial interpretation or by legislation, to revise these
rules, or to make new ones, in order to clarify the law and give the con-
sumer his just relief.
Since the rule was first laid down in Winterbottom v. Wright'
that a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor is not liable to a third person
1(1842) 10 M. and W. 109, 152 Eng. Reprint 402. See also COOLEY,
LAW OF TORTS (Throckmorton ed. 1930) 345, pp. 695-9.
14
Montana Law Review, Vol. 9 [1948], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol9/iss1/13
